Globalization is an advanced stage of social development, and represents a moment of intense convergence, whereby diverse cultures and societies across the globe and engaged in exchange of information, ideas, goods, experiences, and technologies. This raises two important questions: what accounts for such intensification? Is economic exchange and profit-maximization sufficient grounds for globalization? On the surface, globalization might be seen as the outcome of the increase of trade activities and the improvement in the means of communication and transportation. Indeed, there is no denying the importance of trade and economic activities. But this alone cannot explain the rise of globalization.

I will examine in this article the dynamics behind the evolution of modern globalism. Such an examination is important not only because understanding the dynamic of globalization is central to explaining the reasons for the nationalist sentiments at the core of the contemporary political tensions, but also because this is crucial for understanding the trajectory of globalization.  We already have two grand theories regarding globalization trajectory, one predicts the continuation of the convergence of world cultures, culminating in perpetual peace put out by Francis Fukuyama, and the other predicts the opposite, the breaking up of humanity into ethno-religious civilizations in a new round of divergence and conflict, which is the core of the theory advanced by Samuel Huntington. I will argue in the remainder of this article that each of the two theories provides invaluable insights into the future as each address facets of the globalization puzzle, though none provides a complete account of the past and the present, and hence offer an incomplete view of the future.

Francis Fukuyama’s End of History

Fukuyama formulated his initial views of the direction of historical progress in 1989 in the year the Soviet model of sociopolitical organization collapsed. His main views on the direction of globalization after the collapse of the communist block can be found in the End of History. His thinking represents a long-held view by liberal authors who have always considered the Soviet experimentation as disruptive and subversive. The widely held view was advanced by the advocates of Modernization Theory that saw convergence as the direct result of economic growth and the secularization of the non-Western cultures. The all insisted that Modernization requires secularization, an argument that was epitomized by Daniel Learner’s assertion in 1958 that Islam influence on Middle Eastern society is on the decline: “Whether from the East or the West, modernization poses the same basic challenge: the infusion of a rationalist and positivist spirit” against which scholars seem agreed, Islam is absolutely defenseless.”

The moment of convergence seemed quite ripe around the close of the twentieth century, and Fukuyama could not resist the conclusion that the European model of liberalism is final, a conclusion he shared with the nineteenth century German philosopher Hegel. Fukuyama fully embraces the Hegelian unilinear theory of history. He sees liberal democracy as the final state of the political evolution of human society and the end of ideology. I don’t intend undertake a review of Fukuyama’s work, or that of Huntington for that matter, but would touch on key points that guide his thinking on the global order:

1. Liberalism is the final ideology as it successfully outlived its competitors, and it is stable, complete, and final.
2. The “final man” is be tamed and he will be content with peace.
3. That the liberalism that liberated Europe from autocracy and religious dogmatism is the same liberalism that governs the world today.

Fukuyama’s assertions are not completely wrong. They are, rather, exaggerations and generalizations from within confined historical horizons. They are based on “assumptions” that contradict human experience and human psychology.  For example, while convergence is evident, it is evidently incomplete. We can go further to say a complete convergence has neither taken place in Western society itself, nor is it desirable. For in the absence of different or opposing ideologies and cultures, society will stagnate and will be weakened. It is the equivalent of saying that democratic societies will reach a point where the ideology and the priorities upheld by the opposition will convergence with those the established power. Should this happen, corruption will set in, since no one can identify the weak spots of social and political actors. Pluralism and competition are key for political stability and progress, and corruption often results from eliminating all possible conflicts in society.

Furthermore, Fukuyama completely ignores the nature of liberalism in its mutated form of neoliberalism. The current triumph is not that of liberalism, but of neoliberalism. Classical liberal thinking that brought about international humanitarian law and the UN has been weakened beyond recognition in the neoliberal thinking that dominates local and global institutions. Classical liberalism has also disappeared from political debates, as the table below illustrates.

The globalization envisaged by Kant, the philosopher who set liberalism on solid ground, was described in his perpetual peace essay.  The two pillars of the international system created a sense of global unity and enhanced cooperation among nations. The international system has regrettably failed in protecting weaker nations and providing global security and economic development. The examples that underscore the failure of modern liberalism in supporting global security and global economic development are many, reflected in the unequal development between the South and North, and the failure of the economy of many developing countries, most notably that of South America, Africa, and MENA, and the rise of autocratic dictatorships in these huge regions.

Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations

Civilizational Conflicts are the next pattern of conflicts. “The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.” (Huntington, 22) But what is civilization? And does Huntington have a good grasp and understanding of the concept and phenomenon? Huntington defines civilization as “the highest cultural grouping of people, and the broadest level of cultural identity people …” (Huntington, 24) He goes further to state that “Civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations. These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and possibly African civilization.” (Huntington, 25) His evidence of civilizational clash comes from his reading of history, a generalized, and partial reading for that matter, that may be summarized in the following three points:

• “The fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed. “ (Huntington,  29(
• “Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for l,300 years.” (Huntington, 29)
• the revival of religious sentiments, and the decline of ideology.

Failing to see the Eurocentric worldview he espouses and downplaying the impact of US foreign policy on the people of the South. His views are symptomatic of his inability to appreciate the importance of respecting the cultural and religious traditions of other people.

Islamic Civilization

Huntington takes a prejudicial position toward Islam, seeing Islam as a problem for the modern West, as he sees to be completely oblivious to the great contribution the Arabic and Islamic civilization has made for transforming Europe from a society of masters and slaves to a modern and free society. His views toward Islam may be summarized in the following statement: “The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the U.S. Department of Defense. It is the West, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining, power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world. These are the basic ingredients that fuel conflict between Islam and the West.” Huntington unwittingly admits his aversion to allowing non-Western society their own cultures and his Eurocentric attitude in a remarkable passage:

“In the 1960s and 1970s Westernized and pro-Western governments in developing countries were threatened by coups and revolutions; in the 1980s and 1990s they are increasingly in danger of being ousted by elections. Democratization conflicts with Westernization, and democracy is inherently a parochializing not a cosmopolitanizing process. Politicians in non-Western societies do not win elections by demonstrating how Western they are. Electoral competition instead stimulates them to fashion what they believe will be the most popular appeal, and those are usually ethnic, nationalistic, and religious in character.”

His generalization is rooted in the contemporary confusion of Islamic extremist groups with Islamic faith and values, as he evidently fails to see that current Muslim societies do not represent the Islamic civilization. Muslims in general, and political and intellectual elites have internalized much of the Western civilization. The neo-fundamentalism does not retain much of the spirit of the Islamic civilization: its scientific orientation, arts, openness to diversity, etc. The only thing that has been retained is the fighting spirit against invaders and colonizers, but even this has been distorted. Contemporary Jihad undertaken by the Salafi-Jihadi movement is a nihilistic type of Jihad. Interestingly, Huntington does not call for competitive global order, but one that ensure balance of power.  Rather, he calls for maintaining hostility and aggressive actions, particularly towards the Islamic the Confucius civilizations.

While these theories provide invaluable insights into the future and help understand facets of the globalization puzzle, they at the same time provide an incomplete account of the past and the present, and hence offer an incomplete view of the future. A big part of the puzzle lies in the relationship between civilization and culture and the transition that took place in the mid-twentieth century from classical liberalism to neoliberalism.